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This paper analyzes data from a randomized experiment 
on mean returns to capital in Sri Lankan micro-
enterprises. The findings show greater returns among 
men than among women; indeed, returns were not 
different from zero for women. The authors explore 
different explanations for the lower returns among 
female owners, and find no evidence that the gender 
gap is explained by differences in ability, risk aversion, 
or entrepreneurial attitudes. Differential access to 
unpaid family labor and social constraints limiting 
sales to local areas are not important. However, there is 
evidence that women invested grants differently from 
men. A smaller share of the smaller grants remained 
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in the female-owned enterprises, and men were more 
likely to spend the grant on working capital and women 
on equipment. The gender gap is largest when male-
dominated sectors are compared with female-dominated 
sectors, although female returns are lower than male 
returns even for females working in the same industries 
as men. The authors examine the heterogeneity of returns 
to determine whether any group of businesses owned 
by women benefit from easing capital constraints. The 
results suggest there is a large group of high-return male 
owners and a smaller group of poor, high-ability, female 
owners who might benefit from more access to capital. 
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 1. Introduction 
Many microfinance organizations lend predominately or almost exclusively to 
women. For example, 97 percent of Grameen Bank’s seven million borrowers are 
women
1, as are 70 percent of FINCAs borrowers
2, and 65 percent of ACCIÓN’s five 
million clients.
3 Many of the justifications are economic in nature. Women are argued to 
be poorer than men on average (e.g Burjorjee et al., 2002; FINCA, 2007), have less 
collateral, and hence be more credit-constrained (e.g. Khandker, 1998; SEAGA, 2002). 
Muhammad Yunus (2004, p. 4078) writes that “women have greater long-term vision and 
are ready to bring changes in their life step by step. They are also excellent managers of 
scarce resources, stretching the use of every resource to the maximum”.  
But are women in low-income countries more constrained by finance than men? 
There is surprisingly little evidence on this question. Udry (1996) and others provide 
some evidence that men are favored in intra-household allocation of resources in rural 
households. Studies of microfinance clients in several countries suggest that female-
owned enterprises grow more slowly and generate lower profits than male-owned 
enterprises.
4 But the samples for studies of clients of microfinance programs reflect 
selection decisions both on the part of enterprise owners as to whether or not to apply for 
a loan, and on the part of lenders as to whether or not to lend. The limited work on 
returns to capital in the broader population of microenterprises seldom differentiates 
returns by gender, and is still subject to the problem that capital stock is not exogenously 
determined. We are unaware of any convincing evidence on gender differences in the 
productivity of incremental investments across households. We provide evidence on that 
in this paper, using data from a field experiment among microenterprises in Sri Lanka.  
For the experiment, we sampled microenterprises with less than US$1000 in 
equipment and working capital in three districts in southern Sri Lanka. We provided 
random grants, half in cash and half as purchases of inputs or equipment selected by the 
                                                 
1 http://www.grameen-info.org/bank/index.html [Numbers as of May 2007], accessed August 15, 2007. 
2http://www.villagebanking.org/site/c.erKPI2PCIoE/b.2604299/k.FFD9/What_is_Microfinance_What_is_
Village_Banking.htm, accessed August 15, 2007. 
3 http://www.accion.org/about_key_stats.asp [all clients 1976-2006], accessed August 15, 2007. 
4 Kevane and Wydick (2001) provide a survey of several studies of investment behavior of microenterprise 
owners by gender, with mixed results found. In their own work, they find no significant difference between 
male and female borrowers in Guatemala in their ability to generate increases in sales. See McPherson 
(1996), Mead and Liedhom (1998), and Grasmuck and Espinal (2000) for additional evidence on the size 
and growth of  enterprises owned by men and women.  
  -  -  2enterprise owner, to about 60 percent of the sampled enterprises. Two-thirds of the grants 
were $100 and the other third were for $200, representing about 50 and 100 percent of 
the median capital stock. Randomization generates exogenous differences in the capital 
stock of firms, allowing estimation of the return to capital that is not subject to 
endogeneity concerns. In de Mel, McKenzie and Woodruff (2008a), we show that the 
mean real return to capital is around 5.3 percent per month, much higher than market 
interest rates. We also show that returns to capital are heterogeneous, varying with 
measures of ability, household liquidity, and the gender of the owner. With respect to 
gender, we find returns of around 9 percent per month in enterprises owned by males, but 
not different from zero in enterprises owned by females. Thus, not only does the average 
female owner have a lower return than the average male owner, but on average female-
owned enterprises see no return from grants which averaged 50 to 100 percent of the pre-
experiment capital stock. 
In this paper, we explore various explanations for the large gender gap in returns, 
drawing on the existing literature in economics, sociology and anthropology. Aside from 
differential credit constraints, the literature suggests several reasons returns may differ for 
women and men. First, men have been found to re-invest a larger share of the profits 
generated into the business (Grasmuck and Espinal, 2000), perhaps reflecting the 
difference between men and women in spending priorities. Men may also have more 
power within the household, giving them more access to unpaid labor of older children or 
to resources generated by their spouse (Ypeij 2000). Either social conventions or the need 
to be near home to watch children may lead women to work in different industries than 
men. The same factors may limit the ability of women to travel, reducing the size of their 
sales market, and hence demand for their goods. Because women are not continually in 
the labor market, they may have more limited business networks (Ypeij 2000). Finally, 
women may differ with respect to risk aversion or ability.  
We put structure to these alternative explanations with a simple model of 
investment. The model shows that returns could vary due to differences in access to 
credit, differences in access to capital and labor within the household, differences in the 
markets for output, differences in entrepreneurial ability, differences in risk aversion, and 
differences in the sector of work. We find that the gender difference in returns to the 
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aversion, and a rich set of ability measures. The data suggest that women do invest their 
grants differently than men. Over the three years our surveys span, we find that on 
average none of the $100 grants remain in female-owned enterprises, while all of the 
smaller grants remain in male-owned enterprises. Females, on the other hand, invest and 
retain in the business a somewhat larger portion of the $200 grants. Compared with men, 
women were more likely to invest in equipment like ovens, sewing machines, or 
furniture, and less likely to invest in inventories and working capital.  
But we find a marked difference between males and females in the returns 
generated by grants which are invested. As with the returns to the treatments, these 
differences are not explained by differences in measured ability, differences in 
entrepreneurial attitudes, the location of the business, or the percentage of sales made 
outside of the immediate neighborhood. Differences in sector of work may explain some 
of the difference. The gap in returns is much larger when we compare female-only 
industries such as lace to male-only industries such as repair services. Nevertheless, we 
still find women to have returns near zero in industries in which both male- and female-
owned enterprises both comprise at least 25 percent of the sector’s firms. 
As with any finding based on data from a single country, we should ask whether 
the findings are likely to hold in other regions or countries. Using cross sectional data 
from Brazil and Mexico, we show that similar gender differences appear in urban 
households in these countries. Women earn a significantly lower return on marginal 
investments of capital, and the gap is larger in sectors in which either males or females 
predominate and smaller in sectors in which both males and females are active.  
Finally, while the results from the Sri Lankan data show zero average return for 
women, they do not imply that there are no female-owned enterprises which have high 
returns. In the final section of the paper we examine the heterogeneity of returns among 
female-owned enterprises, and show that returns are indeed high for the subset of high-
ability, financially-constrained firms. However, at least in our data, male-owned firms are 
on average more constrained and have higher returns to marginal capital investments, 
suggesting an economic efficiency argument for directing more resources towards them. 
  -  -  4The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the 
experiment and Sri Lankan context. Section 3 estimates the mean treatment effect and 
return to capital by gender. Section 4 provides a simple model to detail avenues through 
which returns may differ by gender, and Section 5 explores these empirically. Section 6 
explores non-experimental data from Brazil and Mexico to see if the pattern of returns is 
similar in those countries, Section 7 investigates the heterogeneity of returns across 
female-owned enterprises, and Section 8 concludes. 
 
2. Data and Experimental Design 
We summarize here the sample of microenterprises and the experiment which 
randomly provided grants to some microenterprise owners. More details on the basic 
experimental design can be found in de Mel, McKenzie and Woodruff (2008a). 
 
2.1. Participants and Survey design 
The goal of our experiment was to provide a positive shock (in the form of a grant) to 
the capital stock of firms, and measure the return to this shock. Our target population was 
low-capital microenterprise owners, those with less than 100,000 Sri Lankan rupees 
(LKR, about US$1000) in capital, excluding land and buildings. The upper threshold 
assured that the grants our budget allowed us to provide would result in measurable 
changes in capital stock. Additionally, previous research had suggested that returns to 
capital were particularly high for enterprises with very low capital stocks (McKenzie and 
Woodruff, 2006). In addition to the capital stock threshold, a microenterprise owner had 
to fulfill all of the following conditions to be included in our sample: 
(a)  be self-employed full-time (at least 30 hours per week) outside of agriculture, 
transportation, fishing and professional services; 
(b) be aged between 20 and 65; and, 
(c)  have no paid employees.  
Using the 2001 Sri Lankan Census, we selected 25 Grama Niladhari divisions (GNs) in 
three Southern and South-Western districts of Sri Lanka: Kalutara, Galle and Matara. A 
GN is an administrative unit containing on average around 400 households. We used the 
Census to select GNs with a high percentage of own-account workers and modest 
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below the threshold we had set. GNs were also stratified according to the degree of 
exposure of firms to the December 26, 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. A door-to-door 
screening survey of 3361 households in these GNs was then conducted to identify firms 
whose owners satisfied the criteria listed above. In April 2005, the first wave of the Sri 
Lanka Microenterprise Survey (SLMS) surveyed the 659 firm owners which the screen 
identified as meeting these criteria. After reviewing the baseline data, 42 firms were 
dropped because they exceeded the capital stock threshold, or because a follow-up visit 
could not verify the existence of the enterprise. This gives a baseline sample of 617 
microenterprises. The implications of the sample design for the selectivity of the sample 
of female and male owned enterprises is discussed in more detail in Appendix A.  
  In this paper we exclude the firms which suffered damage to business assets as a 
result of the tsunami, since recovery of assets damaged by the tsunami might affect 
returns to capital. This leaves 405 firms to be used in this paper, of which 197 are run by 
males and 190 by females. For the remaining 18 firms both husband and wife claim 
themselves as owner. Given their small number, we also drop these dual owner firms. 
The result is a sample of 387 firms almost evenly split by gender and across two broad 
industry categories: retail sales, and manufacturing/services. Firms in retail trade are 
typically small grocery stores. The manufacturing/services firms cover a range of 
common occupations of microenterprises in Sri Lanka, including sewing clothing, 
making lace products, making bamboo products, repairing bicycles, and making food 
products such as hoppers and string hoppers.  
  The SLMS then re-interviewed the owners of these firms at quarterly intervals for 
two years, and semi-annually for a third year. We use 11 waves of data, with the eleventh 
wave gathered in April 2008. In each wave, firm owners were asked about profits, 
revenues and expenses, changes in physical capital stock, and levels of inventories on 
hand. Profits were obtained through direct elicitation, which we find to be more reliable 
than constructing profits from detailed questions on revenue and expenses (de Mel, 
McKenzie and Woodruff, 2008b). Nominal profits were converted into real profits using 
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5 Each round also attempted to collect 
additional information about the firm or owner, in the form of special modules to 
measure owner ability, risk aversion, labor history, and other characteristics. We will 
discuss some of these measures in detail later in the paper. In addition, the first, fifth, and 
ninth and eleventh waves of the panel also included a household survey, measuring 
household expenditure, school attendance, and work participation of all household 
members. 
  Attrition in the SLMS is quite low. 370 of our 387 firms reported profits in the 
baseline survey. In the fifth wave (one year later), 348 firms reported profits, an attrition 
rate of only 5.9 percent. In the eleventh wave (three years after the baseline), we still 
have 319 firms with reported profits, for cumulative attrition of 13.8 percent. We 
concentrate our analysis on the unbalanced panel of 365 firms reporting at least three 
waves of profit data. There is no significant difference in attrition rates by gender: 63.5 
percent of males are in all 11 waves, compared to 63.7 percent of females, 93.4 percent of 
males have at least 3 waves and are included in the sample we used after trimming large 
changes in profits, compared to 95.8 percent of females (p-value = 0.22). 
 
2.2. The Experiment 
Firms were told before the initial survey that as compensation for participating in 
the survey, we would conduct a random prize drawing, with prizes of cash or 
inputs/equipment for the business. The prize consisted of one of four grants: 10,000 LKR 
(~$100) in materials for their business, 20,000 LKR in materials, 10,000 LKR in cash, or 
20,000 LKR in cash. In the case of in-kind grants, the materials were selected by the 
enterprise owner, and purchased by research assistants working for the project.
6 Cash 
                                                 
5 Source: Sri Lanka Department of Census and Statistics, 
http://www.statistics.gov.lk/price/slcpi/slcpi_monthly.htm [accessed February 17, 2007]. Inflation was low 
over the first year of the survey, with a 4.0 percent annual rate. Inflation was higher in the second and third 
years of the survey, with an annual rates of 18.6 percent between March 2006 and March 2007, and 28.0 
between March 2007 and March 2008. The Sri Lankan price indices were revamped in November 2007, 
and the all island index we use was discontinued. We estimate the March 2008 value of the index by 
applying the rate of increase in the Colombo area index between March 2007 and March 2008. 
6 In order to purchase the goods for these entrepreneurs receiving in kind treatments, research assistants 
visited several firms in the evening to inform them they had won an in kind prize. The winning 
entrepreneurs were asked what they wanted to buy with the money, and where they would purchase it. The 
research assistants then arranged to meet them at the market where the goods were to be purchased at a 
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purchase anything they wanted, whether for their business or for other purposes. 
After the first round of the survey, 124 firms were randomly selected to receive a 
treatment, with 84 receiving a 10,000 LKR treatment and 40 receiving a 20,000 LKR 
treatment. The randomization was done within district (Kalutara, Galle, and Matara) and 
zone (unaffected and indirectly affected by the tsunami). A second lottery was held after 
the third round of the survey, with an additional 104 firms selected at random from 
among those who didn’t receive treatment after the first round: 62 receiving the 10,000 
LKR treatment and 42 the 20,000 LKR treatment. In each case half of the firms received 
the treatment in cash, and the other half in kind. Allocation to treatment was done ex 
ante, and as a result, there were an additional seven firms who were assigned to receive 
treatment after round 3, but who had attrited from the survey by then. Finally, a token 
cash payment of 2,500 LKR (~$25) was made after round 5 to firms which had not 
already received a treatment. This payment was not discussed in advance with firms, and 
was presented as a thank-you for their continued participation in the survey.
7 
The median initial level of invested capital, excluding land and buildings, was 
about 18,000 LKR, implying the small and large treatments correspond to approximately 
55 percent and 110 percent of the median initial invested capital. The 10,000 LKR 
treatment was equivalent to about three months of median profits reported by the firms in 
the sample, and the larger treatment equivalent to six months of median profits. By either 
measure, the treatment amounts were large relative to the size of the firms.  
  In de Mel, McKenzie and Woodruff (2008a) we show that we can not reject 
equality of effects of the cash and in kind treatments, nor can we reject linearity of the 
treatment effect with the 20,000 LKR treatment having double the effect of the 10,000 
LKR treatment. For most of the analysis, then, we pool the cash and in-kind treatments, 
to create a single treatment variable which varies in amount. We will test whether pooling 
                                                                                                                                                 
specified time the next day. Thus, the goods purchased and the place/market where they were purchased 
were chosen by the entrepreneurs with no input from the research assistants. 
 
7 The initial funding covered five waves of the survey. The 2,500 rupee payment was made to limit attrition 
after additional funding was obtained to extend the survey for an additional four waves. We count the 2,500 
LKR payment as a treatment in the analysis because owners told us they invested a similar amount of each 
of the three cash amounts in the enterprise, but the results are not affected if this payment is instead 
ignored. 
  -  -  8the 11 rounds of the data is reasonable, or whether the impact of the treatment changes 
with the time since treatment.  
 
2.3. Verifying Randomization  
Note that allocation to treatment was not stratified by gender. Nevertheless, 
provided the sample sizes are large enough, randomization will still lead the treated 
women to be comparable in terms of pre-treatment characteristics to the untreated 
women, and similarly for men. We verify this for observable characteristics in Table 1. 
Randomization does appear to have given comparable treatment and control groups in 
terms of baseline observable variables. For both men and women we see no significant 
difference in baseline profits, sales, capital stock, and owner characteristics between 
firms which are later treated and firms which are in the control group.  
 
3. Mean Treatment Effects and Returns to Capital by Gender 
To test whether the treatment has the same mean impact on business profits for 
female owners as it does for male owners we estimate for firm i in period t: 
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   (1) 
Where AMOUNTi,t is an indicator of how much treatment firm i had received at time t, 
coded in terms of 100 LKR so that the coefficients can be read as monthly percentage 
returns. AMOUNT therefore takes value 100 if by time t the firm had received the 10,000 
LKR treatment, 200 if the firm received had the 20,000 LKR treatment, 25 if they had 
received the 2,500 LKR payment after round 5, and 0 if they were untreated as of time t. 
We include individual fixed effects to account for any time-invariant characteristics of 
owners that also influence profits. Since randomization appears to have held on the sub-
samples, including these effects is not necessary, but their inclusion can improve 
efficiency by accounting for more of the variation across owners in profits. The δs are 
period effects, which we also interact with the female dummy variable to allow for 
different time paths of profits for male and female enterprises. The coefficient β gives the 
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females. We test 
i)  γ≠0 (female-owned businesses have a different increase in profits than male 
owned businesses from the treatment), and  
ii)  γ+β=0 (there is no effect of the treatment on profits of female-owned 
businesses). 
Equation (1) shows the impact on business profits of giving cash or materials to firm 
owners. Since some of the grant may not be invested in the business (even the in-kind 
grant may be partially de-capitalized), this will not give the return to capital. Moreover, if 
male and female owners invest different amounts of the treatment in their business, we 
may find different treatment effects despite similar returns to capital. We therefore also 
estimate the returns to capital directly by using the treatment amount to instrument capital 
stock Ki,t in the following regression:  
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     (2) 
Capital stock is measured as the total value of capital stock and inventories, excluding 
land and buildings. We can then test whether the returns to capital differ by gender (γ1≠0) 
and whether the returns to capital are zero for female enterprises (γ1+β1=0). 
 
3.1. Gender Differences in Treatment Effects and Returns 
  We begin by using real profits as the dependent variable. However, since profits 
include the earnings of the firm owner, any increase in profit from the treatment will be a 
combination of the return to capital and of the return to the owner of any adjustment in 
labor hours worked. Recall that since we are including individual fixed effects, the 
average hours of work are already implicitly adjusted for, and it is only changes in hours 
that we need worry about. When we estimate equation (1) using own hours worked as the 
dependent variable, we find the mean treatment effect is an increase of 1.8 hours per 
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in hours is the same for males and females, and neither effect is significant.
8  
To isolate the impact of capital, we subtract the implicit wage earned by the firm 
owner. We estimate the marginal return to own labor using the baseline data to regress 
profits on capital stock, owner characteristics, and hours of work. We allow the hours 
effect to vary by three education levels and by gender. The value of an additional hour 
worked varies from zero to 9.2 rupees per hour.  
  Profit data are noisy. Measurement error can cause extreme changes in profits 
from one period to the next, reducing our power to detect changes in profits resulting 
from the treatments. We verified with the survey firm all observations with very large 
changes in either direction from one period to the next.  Many of these were keypunch 
errors, which we corrected. Others may be errors of enumerators made in the field, but 
we have no way to verify this. For several observations with a large fall in profits, the 
survey firm told us that the business was closed for a period because of illness of the 
owner, or because of a lack of demand. Because these occurrences represent real risks of 
operating a business, we choose to trim only the top 1% of the sample ranked by changes 
in profits (in both percentages and levels). In practice, this trims observations for which 
profits increase by more than 608 percent or 15,000 LKR from one quarter to the next.
9  
Table 2 reports the results of estimating equations (1) and (2). Columns 1 and 2 
show the mean treatment effect for real profits and real profits adjusted for hours worked 
by the owner. Columns 3 through 4 display the corresponding returns to capital 
regressions. Column 1 shows that a 10,000 LKR treatment increases real profits for 
treated males by 804 LKR per month, or 8.0 percent of the treatment amount. However, 
there is a large negative and significant gender interaction. The overall female effect is 
the sum of the female interaction and overall effect, and is -20 rupees or negative 0.20 
percent per month, which is not statistically significant from zero. That is, we can not 
                                                 
8 There is a significant increase in hours worked in the periods immediately following treatment, but this 
dissipates with time. In the period immediately following treatment, hours worked increases by 4.4 hours 
per week for males and 4.6 hours per week for females, both significant at the .05 level. In the second or 
later rounds after treatment, however, the measured effect on male hours returns very close to zero while 
the effect on female hours worked is always negative but insignificant.  
9 Note that if the increase represents a permanent change in the operation of the business, then we will lose 
only one observation, since in subsequent quarters growth rates will be modest again. The observation-
specific trimming thus eliminate coding errors without excluding firms which are growing rapidly. 
  -  -  11reject that the treatment has no effect on mean profits for female-owned enterprises. 
Column 2 shows that the gender gap is not caused by differential adjustments in labor 
supply after the treatment. If anything, since men increase hours worked slightly more 
than women after treatment, controlling for hours worked increases the gender gap 
(column 2). By either measure, we find large positive and significant treatment effects for 
males, whereas treatment effects for women are not statistically different from zero, with 
negative point estimates. 
In columns 3 and 4 we examine gender differences in returns to capital. Column 3 
uses real profits as the dependent variable, ignoring the effect of the capital injection 
coming through hours worked, while column 4 adjusts profits for the value of the 
owner’s time. In either case, the mean real returns to capital are estimated to be just over 
11 percent per month for males, and slightly negative but not significantly different from 
zero for females. Note that the first-stage estimating the effect of treatment on capital 
stock levels shows a coefficient on the treatment amount of 0.73 for males and 0.70 for 
females, suggesting that on average 73 percent of the treatment given male owners ended 
up as capital stock for the business, while females invested almost as much. We explore 
this in more detail below. 
The final two columns of Table 2 allow the treatment effect to vary with the 
number of quarters since the treatment was administered. If the initial shocks generate 
large profits, we might expect some part of those profits to be reinvested in the enterprise. 
On the other hand, shocks to household cash needs might lead to some disinvestment of 
the treatments over time. We find no significant trend for either males (Column 5) or 
females (Column 6). For both males and females, the standard errors increase with time 
after treatment, suggesting an increasing dispersion over time. Finding no significant time 
trend, we pool the data across all 11 rounds of the survey for the remainder of the paper.  
 
3.2. Investment of Treatments 
  The first stage results shown on the bottom panel of Table 2 indicate that females 
retained an average over the eleven survey rounds of 70 percent of the treatment amount 
in the enterprise. The comparable percentage for males is slightly higher, 73 percent.  We 
examine the investment decisions more closely in Table 3. Note that once we divide the 
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therefore be viewed as suggestive rather than definitive. Table 3 shows that the 
investment behavior differed by treatment level. The right hand side variables are all 
binary variables indicating the gender and treatment levels. The first row of column 1 
indicates that averaged over the eleven survey rounds, males invested 138 percent of the 
smaller treatment in their enterprises. This suggests the use of complementary resources 
or the reinvestment of generated profits by male owners. Females, on the other hand, 
invested none of the 10,000 LKR treatments. The female interaction term is -1.39, 
meaning that the measured investment level is -0.01 for females. But for the larger 
treatment amounts, females invested, if anything, more than males. While males invested 
just over 60 percent of the 20,000 LKR treatment, females invested 85 percent of the 
larger treatment (1.22 plus 0.48 divided by two to reflect the treatment amount). The 
second column of Table 3 limits the sample to the single quarter immediately following 
the treatment, in order to show the immediate investment effects. Females do appear to 
invest some part of the 10,000 LKR treatment, though only 22 percent of this treatment 
finds its way into the enterprise in the quarter immediately following the grant. Males had 
invested just over 60 percent of the smaller treatment within the first three months.
10  
  Given these differences in the response of investment, column 3 of Table 3 shows 
a regression which allows the returns to the treatment to vary by treatment level and 
gender. The pattern of returns generally reflects the pattern of investment. Males 
receiving the 10,000 LKR treatment have profit increases which are greater than those of 
males who received the larger treatment. This is consistent with the fact that males 
invested on average 138 percent of the smaller treatment and only 63 percent of the larger 
treatment. We do not find any increase in profits for females following the smaller 
treatment, consistent with the fact that no part of that treatment found its way into the 
enterprise. However, even females receiving the larger treatment did not obtain higher 
profits, in spite of the fact that they invested 85 percent of the treatment amount.  
                                                 
10 Owners receiving cash grants were asked in the survey following the treatment how they had spent the 
cash grant. Among those receiving the 10,000 LKR grants, females report spending significantly less on the 
business (4,900 vs. 7,700, p<.01) and more on household durable or nondurable consumption (2,700 vs., 
1,600, p=.09). 
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invest in different types of assets? For the half of the treatments given in kind, we have 
very detailed information on the purchases. For the half given as cash, we know from 
follow-up surveys whether the initial investments were made in inputs or equipment. 
Males invested a larger share of their grants in inventories and working capital (58 
percent vs. 45 percent for female, p=.03). Among the equipment purchases, women 
appear to have spent more on items which have uses both in the business and in the 
home—sewing machines, ovens, cookers, furniture, and the like. This largely reflects the 
fact that they are more likely to work in food processing and garments. But our profit 
data will not reflect the consumption value to the household of the purchases. For both 
males and females, we find weak evidence that the return to investments in equipment is 
lower than the return to investments in working capital, with the gap slightly larger for 
females. Columns 4 and 5 of Table 3 show the increase in profits as a function of the 
amount spent on working capital and the amount spend on capital equipment. For males, 
working capital investments have returns of 8.5 percent per month, while equipment 
investments return 5.3 percent per month. For females, the comparable estimates are 1.4 
percent for working capital and -5.8 percent for equipment. The somewhat larger gap for 
females may reflect the greater value in home consumption of the equipment purchased 
by females.  
  In sum, we find that females invest little of the smaller treatment amount, but 
more of the larger treatment amount than do males. Females who do invest the grants in 
the enterprise show no increase in profits as a result. We next develop a simple 
framework for thinking about investment decisions in household enterprises.  
 
4. A Simple Model to Explain Why Returns May Vary by Gender 
With perfect markets and diminishing returns to capital, we would predict that in 
steady state all firms will chose their capital stock such that the marginal return to capital 
equals the market interest rate. In practice, however, both credit and insurance markets 
are imperfect, which can lead marginal returns to vary across firms and owners. A simple 
model can be used to identify the main potential sources of heterogeneity in returns, 
which can then be used to investigate gender differences in returns. 
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differences in the production function by industry. Consider a simple one-period model in 
which an enterprise owner supplies labor inelastically to the business. The enterprise 
owner is endowed with entrepreneurial ability θ and has chosen to work in sector s. 
Males and females of the same entrepreneurial ability may have chosen different sectors 
to work in due to differences in preferences, or to societal norms. The owner can finance 
capital stock K through the formal credit market by borrowing (B), or through its internal 
household capital market, by allocating AK of its endowment of household assets (A) or IK 
of wage income nw earned by the n other working age adults.   
The microenterprise owner’s problem is then to choose the amount of capital 
stock, K, to invest in the business, subject to its budget and borrowing constraints: 
    Max             EU(c) 
{K, B, Ak, Ik} 
Subject to: 
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Where ε is a random variable with positive support and mean one, reflecting the fact that 
production is risky, and r is the market interest rate. The production function of the firm, 
fs(K,θ) depends on the sector s, level of capital stock, and on θ, the ability of the 
entrepreneur.  

























θ    (8) 
where  λ is the lagrange-multiplier on condition (4), and is a measure of how tightly 
overall credit constraints bind. This in turn will depend on both the supply of capital 
available from both the external and internal sources, and on the demand for credit, which 
in turn depends on the production function and own ability.  
  -  -  15  Equation (8) therefore suggests that gender differences in returns to capital may 
arise from the following factors, which we will next investigate empirically: 
(a) Differences in access to capital from the external market: Ceteris paribus, returns 
should be higher for owners with less access to external credit. One reason given 
for focusing microfinance on women is that they typically have more difficulty 
accessing financial services.
11 If so, then women should have higher returns. 
(b) Differences in the shadow cost of capital within the household: Ceteris paribus, 
returns should be higher for owners from poorer households, who are less able to 
finance business investments from own savings. Advocates of focusing 
microfinance on women also claim that women are more likely to be poor
12, in 
which case they should have higher returns. However, another reason for 
microfinance’s focus on women is the belief that women are more likely than men 
to spend the proceeds on improving family welfare, and investing in children’s 
health and education.
13 This may also lead to a high shadow cost of capital within 
the household, causing women to devote less of the treatment to their business. 
This could potentially explain why there is less of a mean treatment effect for 
women than men. Nevertheless, the higher shadow cost of capital for women 
should also mean higher returns on the capital that is invested. 
(c) Differences in entrepreneurial ability: If ability and capital stock are complements 
in production, then, conditional on a given set of internal and external resources, 
individuals with higher entrepreneurial ability will be more constrained and thus 
have higher returns. If women entrepreneurs have less business ability, this could 
potentially explain the lower returns. 
(d) Differences in the sector of production: An individual will be more constrained, 
and thus have higher returns, if their industry has a greater efficient scale. If 
women select into industries with less scope for growth, then even with the same 
access to credit and entrepreneurial ability as men, they will have lower returns. 
                                                 
11 See e.g. Niethammer et al.  (2007); SEAGA (2002) 
12 See e.g. Niethammer et al.  (2007); Burjorjee et al.  (2002);  FINCA (2007). 
13 See e.g. Yunus (2004), Burjorjee et al.  (2002). 
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individuals will underinvest, and hence have higher returns. Differences in risk 
aversion by gender could thus lead to differences in returns. 
 
5. Empirically Investigating Why Returns Are So Low for Women 
The model in the last section suggests several possible explanations for the gender 
differences we observe in returns. We test each of these in turn. 
 
5.1. Do Women Invest More of the Treatment on Children? 
A high shadow cost of capital within the household, whether driven by a desire to 
spend money on children’s education and health, or due to husbands capturing the 
treatments made to females could lead to less of the treatments staying in female-owned 
businesses. We showed in Table 3 that females appear to have invested less of the smaller 
treatment amount, but no less of the larger. In Table 4, we use the survey data to test 
whether the treatment has a greater effect on schooling, expenditures and household asset 
accumulation in households of female microenterprise owners than in households of male 
microenterprise owners. Columns 1 to 3 of Table 4 use the household surveys taken to 
estimate the impact of the treatment on school attendance of 5 to 12 year olds, 12 to 15 
year olds, and 17 to 18 year olds respectively. School attendance information was 
gathered only in the April waves of the survey and the sample for these regressions is 
limited to those households with children of the specified age. We find that the treatment 
has no effect on school attendance regardless of the gender of the owner. 
  We find similarly insignificant differences on expenditures for groceries, health 
and education between households of female owners and households of male owners. 
(See columns 4 through 6 of Table 4). We do find significant differences in the rate at 
which household durable goods ownership increases, and in financial assets. Column 7 of 
Table 4 takes as the dependent variable the first principal component of a vector of 17 
household assets, including landline and cellular telephones, television, autos, bicycles 
and gold jewelry. The weights in the index are derived from baseline data. Asset 
ownership increases generally in the sample, but the regression results reported in column 
7 shows that the increase is significantly larger in households of male enterprise owners 
  -  -  17who received who received the grants. As with enterprise profits, asset ownership in 
households of female entrepreneurs was unaffected by the treatments.  
  The April 2007 and April 2008 household modules contain questions about 
financial assets. Over the two rounds, more females say they have a current account, a 
fixed deposit account or a savings account with a bank or other financial institution (43 
percent vs. 36 percent of males, p=0.04). Households of enterprise owners receiving 
treatments are slightly more likely to have at least one such account (42 percent vs. 36 
percent, p=0.12). However, the treatment effect is again limited to households of male 
owners: 43 percent of both treated and untreated female enterprise owners report having 
an account, while 41 percent of treated males and only 29 percent of untreated males say 
they have an account.
14 
  The schooling and current expenditure data reveal no significant treatment effects 
for either males or females. The lack of any impact of the treatment on health and 
education expenditures may be due to the fact that Sri Lanka has a good, inexpensive, 
state system of schooling and health care. Schooling is compulsive up to age 14, and over 
91 percent of children in our sample of this age are actually attending school. In countries 
where education and health expenses are larger burdens on households, we might find 
more of the treatment being spent on these categories. But males show a large gain in 
both household durable and financial assets following treatment, while females show no 
gain in assets following treatment.  
 
5.2. The Power to Allocate Resources 
  The ability of the owner to invest the grants in profitable activities may be 
affected by her/his power in household decision making. (See Ashraf, 2008 and Duflo, 
2005 for a discussion of the effect of empowerment on household expenditures.) We test 
whether decision making power affects the returns using responses to questions about 
who makes decisions regarding household expenditures and business investments. We 
find no significant effects of decision making for either female or male owners. Column 1 
of Table 5 reports the effect of including a control for the number of 4 household 
                                                 
14 Owners were also asked for the balances in the accounts. The reported balances are highly skewed, but 
show a similar patter. Treated households have higher balances, but only among household with male 
owners.  
  -  -  18purchasing decisions—purchases of food, clothing, durable goods, and other routine 
household expenditures—the business owner has a say in.  Column 2 indicates whether 
the spouse of the owner has a say in business decisions related to reinvestment of profits 
and purchase of equipment. Neither variable is significantly related to the size of the 
treatment effect, and their inclusion has almost no effect on the magnitude of the return to 
treatment for either females or males.
15 
  Women may also be unable to realize potential profits from capital investments 
because they are not able to increase the labor input in the enterprise. They may have a 
harder time expanding their own labor hours because of household responsibilities related 
to the care of children or elderly parents. Men may also have first claim on available 
household labor supplied by children (Ypeij 2000). We explore both of these 
possibilities, and find no support for either. As we noted above, the hours worked by 
male owners does increase slightly more following treatment than the hours worked by 
female owners, but the difference is far from significant. Column 3 of Table 5 shows that 
the number of hours worked in the enterprise by family members other than the owner is 
not affect by the treatment for either males or females. There is a modest negative 
coefficient on the female interaction term, but the effect is not significant either 
statistically or economically. In the 4
th column, we exclude from the sample all 
households with children under age 12 at the time of the baseline survey, or with adults 
over the age of 65. The measured effect of the treatment is still large and positive for 
males and close to zero for females after imposing this restriction, although the smaller 
sample size results in larger standard errors and statistical insignificance. Thus, we find 
no evidence that differences in household decision making explain the lower returns 
earned by females. 
  Another way in which household bargaining power may manifest itself is through 
the gap between actual and reported outcomes. Are female microenterprise owners more 
likely than men to under report business income? One indication of this comes from 
questions we asked about why and how much “firms like yours” over- or under-report 
                                                 
15 These questions were asked in the November 2007 round of the survey, well after the treatments were 
given. However, we find no effect of the treatment on any of the decision making measures. This may be 
the result of the fact that all of the female owners were already working and earning income before the 
baseline survey.  
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the same amount (7850 from females vs. 8067 for males, p=0.55). We also have data on 
who was present at the interview for each round after the baseline survey. If 
unempowered women are deliberately under reporting gains following treatment, we 
should expect to find lower reported profits when the spouse is present at the time the 
interview is conducted.  The last column of Table 5 does show some evidence that the 
presence of the spouse matters for the general level of reporting profits – males 
underreport profits by 433 rupees and females by 216 rupees when their spouse is 
present. As a percentage of average profits, this is approximately the same for both 
groups. More importantly, however, the effect is the same in treated and untreated 
households. When we interact the presence of the spouse with treatment, the interaction 
term is small and statistically insignificant.   
 
5.3. Differences in Access to Capital 
One of the main reasons for the traditional emphasis of microfinance on women is 
a belief that women have less access to formal finance than men. In the baseline survey, 
firms were asked whether they had ever had a loan from banks, the government, 
microfinance, and different government programs. Only 1.8 percent have had a loan from 
a private bank, and 2.1 percent from a microfinance organization. 9.4 percent have had a 
loan from the government, 4.2 percent from the Sanasa Development Bank (an umbrella 
organization of small credit unions), 6.5 percent from the government’s Samurdhi 
program, and 0.5 percent from other government programs such as IDRP and REAP. 
Combined across all of these sources, we find no significant gender difference:  23.4 
percent of females and 23.5 percent of males have ever had a loan from one of these 
formal sources (Table 6).  
The characteristics of females who had ever received formal credit are similar in 
many respects to those of female microenterprise owners who had never received formal 
credit. In particular, they do not significantly differ in age, education, digit-span recall, 
household asset ownership, household size, or the number of wage workers in the 
household. It is thus not the case that credit is more likely to go to firm owners with 
characteristics that our model suggests would be associated with the highest returns.  
  -  -  20Most firm owners in our sample financed the start-up and ongoing capital 
investments through own savings and loans from family. Our survey contains two 
measures of the household internal capital market: the number of paid wage workers in 
the household, and an index of household durable assets constructed as the first principal 
component of baseline indicators of ownership of durable assets such as fans, radios, 
cameras, televisions and motorcycles. Table 6 shows that on average female owners have 
more wage workers and higher household assets to draw upon, measured in the baseline 
survey. As a result, we would expect females to be less constrained, and hence earn lower 
returns. 
  To investigate whether differences in access to capital can explain the gender 
difference in treatment effects, we examine the gender interaction term after controlling 
for interactions between measures of access to credit and the treatment amount. That is, 
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We demean all the X’s, so that β will give the mean treatment effect for males, and γ the 
differential effect for females, evaluated at the mean of the other potential explanatory 
variables. We then examine how sensitive γ is to the inclusion of these other variables, to 
determine whether the gender interaction is really reflecting gender differences in access 
to capital. We use profits adjusted for the value of the owner’s labor input, as described 
above.  
Table 7 shows the results. The first column repeats the basic result from Table 2. 
Columns 2 through 4 then show the impact of controlling for treatment interactions with 
access to bank loans, the number of wage workers, and household assets. Each of these 
controls shows a negative interaction effect, consistent with less constrained owners 
earning lower returns. However, controlling for these interactions does not lead to a 
significant change in the size of the negative female interaction term. We still find high 
returns for males, and can not reject the return being zero for females after these controls 
  -  -  21for differences in access to credit. Therefore it seems the supply side of the external and 
internal credit markets can not explain the difference in returns. 
 
5.4 Differences in Entrepreneurial Ability and Reasons for Going into Business 
  The demand for credit will depend on the optimal size of the enterprise. If capital 
and ability are complements in production, more able owners will have higher optimal 
sizes. Hence, for a given supply of credit, more able owners will be further away from 
their optimal size and have higher marginal returns to capital.  
Entrepreneurial ability is a multifaceted and nebulous concept, which is unlikely 
to be captured fully by general measures of ability such as years of education. The SLMS 
has an extremely rich set of measures of ability, allowing us to consider an array of 
possible measures for entrepreneurial ability. In Table 7 we show three such measures. 
Column 5 shows the standard measure, years of education.  Column 6 shows Digit-span 
recall, a measure of short-term processing power, used in Djankov et al. (2005). Table 6 
shows that females have significantly more education than males, but significantly less 
Digit-span recall. Table 7 finds that both these measures are significant in their 
interactions with the treatment amount, showing larger treatment effects to more able 
individuals. But again, the basic pattern of returns is unchanged by the inclusion of the 
ability measures. Males continue to show, on average, high returns and females near zero 
returns to the treatment.  
Our survey also contains many measures developed by industrial psychologists to 
measure different facets of the entrepreneurial personality. Table 8 examines the 
robustness of the female interaction term to 19 alternative measures of owner ability and 
motivation. These include measures commonly found in economic studies, such as 
mother’s and father’s previous business experience; the time taken for individuals to 
solve a maze (median time was 53 seconds); entrepreneurial traits such as passion for 
work, tenacity (both from Baum and Locke, 2004); entrepreneurial self-efficacy; trust 
(taken from the General Social Survey); the achievement and power motivations of 
McClelland (1985); Work centrality (Mishra et al, 1990); Impulsiveness, from three 
questions on the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale; Financial Literacy (from Lusardi and 
Mitchell, 2006); internal locus of control (Rotter, 1966) and our own questions on 
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and on whether or not their friends and family consider the owner an organized person. 
None of these characteristics are significant when interacted with the treatment effect, 
and the female interaction stays large, negative, and significant. We thus conclude that 
differences in entrepreneurial ability, however measured, do not explain the low returns 
to females. 
 
5.5. Differences in Risk Aversion  
We measure risk aversion as the implied coefficient of relative risk aversion 
obtained by playing lottery games for real money with the firm owners (see de Mel, 
McKenzie, and Woodruff 2008a for details). Although there is a common presumption 
that women are more risk averse than men in many countries, we find that Sri Lankan 
female microenterprise owners are more likely to take risky gambles in these lottery 
games than male owners (Table 6). Since theory would predict that returns are higher for 
more risk averse individuals if missing insurance markets cause them to underinvest, the 
results of these lottery games suggest that differences in risk aversion will not explain the 
low returns for females. Indeed, we see this in column 8 of Table 7, where controlling for 
the interaction with risk aversion does not change the female interaction. This result is 
also robust to an alternative measure of risk aversion. We also followed the German 
Socioeconomic Panel in asking firm owners about the overall willingness to take risks in 
life, on a 10 point scale. This variable has a coefficient of -0.28 (s.e. 0.88) when 
interacted with the treatment amount, and the female interaction with treatment amount is 
-8.84 (s.e. 4.26), which is not significantly different from the baseline model. Thus 
differences in risk aversion do not explain the low returns to females. 
 
5.6. Differences in Industry and Ability to Expand the Business 
The large differences in treatment effects by gender do not appear to be explained 
by differences in access to capital, differences in ability, differences in risk aversion or 
differences in other entrepreneurial attitudes. The remaining potential reason for 
differences in returns according to our theoretical model is that there are differences in 
production technologies across gender.  
  -  -  23  We investigate whether differences in sector of work help account for gender 
differences in returns in Table 9. The first column repeats the treatment effect and return 
to capital regressions found in Table 2. The next column then estimates a version of 
equation (9), which interacts the treatment amount with eight different industry dummy 
variables (to cover nine industries: retail sales, food sales, clothing, sales of non-food, 
lace, repair services, manufacturing, personal services and other services). The regression 
also allows the wave effects to vary with industry. This therefore involves adding eight 
interactions with amount and 80 additional wave effects. The results then show whether, 
within industry, females on average have different effects of the treatment than males. 
We find that the results are robust to controlling for differences across industry, with the 
female interaction becoming slightly more negative, and remaining significant. The 
returns for males fall slightly in magnitude to 5.91 percent, but remain significance at the 
0.10 level. 
  We take a different approach in the last two columns of Table 9, considering more 
detailed industry coding. We classify firms into 73 industry classifications. For example, 
the broader industry of food sales gets divided into finer classifications such as fish sales, 
cashew nut sales, and fruit sales. In column 3 of Table 9 we then re-estimate the 
treatment effects restricting analysis to the narrow industries that both male and female 
owners constitute at least 25 percent of the firm owners in our sample. We limit the 
sample to detailed industries in which there are at least four enterprises. In this reduced 
sample the gender interaction is insignificant but of nearly the same magnitude as in the 
full sample. The point estimates suggest that for this sub-sample, women have average 
returns of 0.9 percent, compared to 13.7 percent for men. Finally, in the last column of 
Table 9 we consider narrow industries in which only men or only women operate in our 
sample. The gender difference is much larger in this subgroup – while male owners in 
industries without females have returns to capital of 9.5 percent, female owners in 
industries without males have returns to capital of negative  8.5 percent. Female-
dominated occupations therefore appear to have particularly poor returns to capital. 
  One plausible explanation for the difference in returns across sectors relates to the 
potential for expanding the customer base after investing additional capital. On average 
female owners report that 68 percent of their customers are within 1 km of their business, 
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Moreover, 48 percent of female firms have all their customers within 1km, compared to 
only 30 percent of men (the difference is significant with p<0.001). However, the 
propensity to sell locally, measured at the time of the baseline survey, is not significantly 
associated with returns to the treatments for either males or females. Thus it appears 
unlikely that the main explanation for the gender difference in returns across sectors is 
due to the geographic limitation of the market. 
  A second potential sector-related explanation is that female-owned businesses are 
more likely to be operated out of the home, where owners may be carrying out other tasks 
such as caring for family members or doing housework at the same time as operating 
their business. 74 percent of female-owned businesses in our sample operate out of the 
home, compared to 52 percent of male-owned businesses. However, Table 8 shows no 
significant interaction between treatment amount and dummy variables for operating a 
business out of the home, or for going into business to care for family members. The 
female-interaction coefficient does not significantly change when we control for either 
explanation. Thus industry differences also appear unlikely to be due to some firms being 
operated out of the home. 
 
6. External Validity 
The experimental results in this paper clearly demonstrate a lower return to capital 
in female-owned enterprises in Sri Lanka than in male-owned enterprises, with the sector 
of work appearing to explain some of this gender difference. As with any empirical result 
based on data from a single country, a question which then arises is whether the results of 
the experiment apply to other settings. In this section we provide suggestive (non-
experimental) evidence that the pattern of returns by gender is not limited to Sri Lanka. 
  We use microenterprise data from detailed microenterprise surveys in Brazil and 
Mexico. The Brazilian data come from the Economia Informal Urbano survey of 2003 
(see Fajnzylber et al. 2006) and Mexican data from pooling the 1992, 1994, 1996 and 
1998 National Survey of Microenterprises (ENAMIN) surveys (see McKenzie and 
Woodruff, 2006). For each survey we restrict our analysis to firm owners aged 18 to 65, 
working more than 30 hours per week, with less than $US500 of capital stock, exclusive 
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16  We convert profits and capital stock into U.S. dollars, and run 
the following cross-sectional regression: 
 
ε π δ γ β α + + ∗ + + + = X FEMALE CAPITAL CAPITAL FEMALE PROFITS '  (10) 
 
Where FEMALE is a dummy variable for females, CAPITAL is capital stock exclusive 
of land and buildings, and X is a set of controls for education, age, and own hours 
worked. The parameter γ provides an estimate of the marginal return to capital for male 
enterprises, and γ + δ the marginal return for female owned enterprises. We are most 
interested in the sign and relative magnitude of δ, the interaction between capital stock 
and the female dummy variable. Of course one is concerned that capital stock may not be 
exogenous in this regression, and may be correlated with unobserved characteristics of 
the owner or firm which also increase profits -  a reason for carrying out a randomized 
experiment in the first place. Nevertheless, our previous experience (de Mel et al. 2008, 
McKenzie and Woodruff 2006, 2008) suggests that these non-experimental regressions 
are informative about the high returns to capital in microenterprises, and at present, they 
offer the only source of information for seeing whether there is any evidence that the 
results of our experiment apply in other countries. 
  Table 10 reports the results of this regression. We begin by pooling together all 
industries. Column 1 shows a return to capital of 16.6 percent in Mexico for males. 
Returns for females are 7.6 percent lower than those for males, a difference significant at 
the .01 level. Column 4 shows a higher return of 40 percent for males in Brazil, with 
female returns significantly lower by 13.2 percent. Thus in both countries there is 
evidence that the return to capital is substantially lower in female-owned 
microenterprises than in male-owned microenterprises. 
  Next we examine whether the return varies with the gender mix of the industries 
being considered in Mexico and Brazil. In Columns 2 and 5 we consider industries which 
are dominated by one gender, measured by having over 75 percent of the firms in the 
sample in this industry being of the same gender. Columns 3 and 6 consider gender-
                                                 
16 This upper limit on capital stock restricts the capital stock to the range over which most firms in our Sri 
Lanka experiment operate. 
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the sample exceed 25 percent. Similar to our experimental results, we see much bigger 
gender differences in returns in industries which are predominately the domain of one 
gender than in the gender mixed industries. This is particularly the case in Brazil, where 
the gender interaction is -19 percent in the industries where either males or females 
predominate, and an insignificant and positive 1.7 percent in the mixed-gender industries. 
In Mexico the differences are not as stark, but the gender interaction is 12.3 percent when 
restricted to industries where one gender dominates, compared to 8.1 percent in the 
mixed gender industries. Thus these results suggest that the experimental differences in 
returns according to the gender mix of the industry are also likely to generalize to other 
settings. 
 
7. Which Women Benefit from the Treatment? 
The above results show that the mean treatment effect is zero for female-owned 
businesses. However, Table 7 also showed that the treatment effect does significantly 
vary with ability. We therefore explore the heterogeneity of treatment effects within the 
sub-sample of female-owned businesses. Table 11 re-estimates the specifications in Table 
7 on the female-owned sub-sample. Column 1 of Table 11 shows the negative and 
insignificant mean treatment effect for females. Columns 2 and 3 show evidence of 
higher returns to higher ability owners. Once we include all the controls in column 4, we 
see that digit-span recall and household assets are associated with higher returns.  
  We use these specifications to estimate the mean treatment effect by observed 
characteristics. The bottom of Table 11 reports the percentage of female-owned 
businesses with mean returns lying in different ranges. For example, column 3 shows a 
large positive and significant coefficient for digitspan recall. The standardized digitspan 
recall has mean zero and ranges from -2.67 to 5.32. 48 percent of female-owners have 
low enough digitspan recall that their mean treatment effect is estimated to lie below 
zero. In contrast, 10 percent have an estimated mean treatment effect between 0 and 200 
rupees, 20 percent an estimated mean treatment effect between 200 and 500 rupees, and 
22 percent an estimated mean treatment effect of 501 rupees or more. When we include 
multiple interactions in column 4, we find 59 percent of firms have mean treatment 
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have mean treatment effects in excess of 500. Thus there is a sizeable share of female 
firms with high mean treatment effects, even though the mean treatment effect for 
females as a whole is negative. 
 
 
8. Discussion and Conclusions 
The economic argument for microfinance’s focus on female-owned businesses is 
that female owners are likely to be poorer and more credit constrained, and to use 
resources more efficiently. If this is the case, we would expect returns to capital to be 
higher in female-owned firms. This paper provides evidence against this view, finding 
mean returns to capital to be zero among female-owned micro-enterprises in Sri Lanka. 
In contrast, returns to capital for male-owned enterprises are in excess of 11 percent per 
month. These large returns show that, on average, male-owned enterprises are more 
likely to generate the return on investment necessary to repay micro-loans.  
Since the experiment gave grants, rather than loans, we are unable to provide 
evidence on another of microfinance’s claims - that women are more likely to repay (in 
part because they are less mobile and have less alternative options for financing).
17 Our 
results do show that there is a subset of women who have high enough returns to cover 
the costs of loans, namely poor, high ability women. However, although microfinance 
penetration in Sri Lanka is among the highest in the World, in our sample it is not the 
case that it has succeeded in targeting these high-return women, let alone the much 
greater number of men who have high returns to capital.  
There is by now quite a lot of evidence that intra household consumption is 
affected by which household member generates income. For example, Duflo and Udry 
(2004) use rainfall patterns and the fact that men and women in rural Cote D’Ivoire 
produce different crops to show that income generation by females has implications for 
household expenditure patterns, even when total household income remains the same. 
Our experiment gave equal amounts of cash or in-kind grants to male and female 
microenterprise owners. We find very clear evidence that males turned the grants into a 
sustained source of income by making profitable investments in their enterprises. During 
                                                 
17 See Morduch (1999). 
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durable goods and financial assets in the households of the male grant recipients. In 
contrast, females, on average, did not generate a sustained source of income from the 
grant. They did not do so either because they did not invest the grant in their enterprise, 
or because they did not earn additional profits when the grant was invested. Why women 
lack profitable investment opportunities, and why they are more likely to enter sectors 
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  -  -  31Appendix A: Sample selection issues 
We set out to obtain a sample of enterprises with less than 100,000 LKR in capital 
stock, excluding capital invested in land and buildings. The initial sample for the 
experiment was from a random selection of households in 25 Grama Niladharis in the Sri 
Lankan districts of Kalutara, Galle and Matara. Grama Niladharis, or GNs, are 
administrative units with an average of about 400 households. The 25 GNs selected had 
high rates of self employment and moderate or low levels of education. A screening 
survey was used to select households into the final sample. The screen asked whether 
there was anyone in the household between the ages of 22 and 65 who was self 
employed. Those working in professional services, fishing, transportation and agriculture 
were eliminated. Those owning a motorized vehicle or hiring paid employees were also 
eliminated. These restrictions were made because enterprises in these industries, or those 
with employees or motor vehicles, are likely to have more than 100,000 LKR in capital. 
Finally, near the beginning of the survey given to enterprise owners meeting these 
criteria, we ask the owner whether the market value of invested capital excluding land 
and buildings was less than 5,000 LKR, between 5,000 and 50,000 LKR, between 50,000 
and 100,000 LKR, or greater than 100,000 LKR. Those reporting capital stocks in excess 
of 100,000 LKR were not interviewed.  
Because returns to capital are expected to be correlated with entrepreneurial ability, 
we are particularly interested in whether and how the sample’s selection on ability differs 
between females and males. This will be affected first by decisions to participate in the 
labor force. Not surprisingly, men are much more likely to be active in the labor market 
than women. According to the 2006 Sri Lankan labor force survey, the labor force 
participation rate of 30-39 year old urban males is 96.4 percent, compared to only 34.4 
percent for the same age urban females (DCS, 2007). Furthermore, only 22.7 percent of 
female workers are self-employed, compared to 30.8 percent of male workers. Thus self-
employed individuals are only 7.8 percent of prime age females, compared to 29.7 
percent of prime age males. While we expect that selection of females into the labor 
market is determined at least in part by ability, attitudes toward risk, and related factors. 
But if capital flows mainly to those with entrepreneurial experience, then those active in 
  -  -  32the labor market are arguably the relevant sample for analysis, so selection at this level is 
of less concern. 
Conditioning on self employment, the sampling criteria may still result in different 
selectivity of females and samples. The resulting sample clearly does not reflect the entire 
population of self employed in Sri Lanka. But it does reflect the population of self 
employed with less than 100,000 LKR of capital stock. With regard to the analysis in this 
paper, our main concern is whether the truncation on capital stock results in different 
selectivity in the female and male sample. Indeed, the data suggest that the sampling 
criteria eliminated more male then female enterprise owners. This reflects both the fact 
that males are more likely than females to be self employed in fishing and transportation, 
and partly this reflects the fact that males have higher levels of invested capital generally. 
The initial screens eliminated about 42 percent of the male self employed and 20 percent 
of the female self employed in eligible industries. A further 20 males and 3 females were 
eliminated when they reported capital stocks in excess of 100,000 LKR at the beginning 
of the baseline enterprise survey. If ability and capital stock are complements, then the 
sample will exclude the most able entrepreneurs for both males and females. The more 
severe truncation for males will result in a more selected sample of males with respect to 
ability. In particular, if males and females have identical ability distributions in the 
population of self employed, males in our sample will have lower ability on average than 
females in our sample. This together with the robustness of the results to inclusion of 
controls for ability leads us to believe that the empirical patterns discussed in the paper 
do not result from differential selectivity.  
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Profits March 2005 188 182 4,735 4,763 0.958 2,819 2,866 0.908
Revenues March 2005 197 190 16,429 14,357 0.397 8,828 8,678 0.933
Total invested capital March 2005 197 190 153,020 176,984 0.547 112,952 143,889 0.214
Total invested capital excluding land 
and buildings March 2005 197 190 33,665 29,719 0.292 20,638 20,734 0.978
Own hours worked March 2005  197 190 58.37 56.83 0.613 50.28 45.75 0.168
Family hours worked March 2005  197 190 12.61 13.93 0.719 27.78 42.24 0.541
Age of entrepreneur 197 190 43.52 42.17 0.427 40.26 41.78 0.340
Age of firm in years 197 188 8.99 11.15 0.172 8.08 8.79 0.631
Years of schooling of entrepreneur 197 190 8.20 8.65 0.308 9.79 9.19 0.182
Proportion whose father was an 
entrepreneur 197 190 0.44 0.42 0.764 0.37 0.32 0.501
Number of household members 
working in wage jobs 197 190 0.54 0.57 0.817 0.87 0.89 0.840
Household asset index  197 190 0.25 0.03 0.347 0.60 0.28 0.169
Number of Digits recalled in Digit 
Span Recall test 179 178 5.86 5.90 0.833 5.61 5.74 0.512
Implied coefficient of relative risk 
aversion from lottery game 197 189 0.28 0.44 0.517 -0.17 -0.07 0.615
P-value from Chi-squared (16) test of joint significance:  0.652 0.781
Means by treatment: Males Means by treatment: Females
Total number of 
observations
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Real Adjusted Real Adjusted Adjusted Adjusted
Profits Real Profits Profits Real Profits Real Profits Real Profits
FE FE IV-FE IV-FE FE FE
MALES FEMALES
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment Amount 8.04*** 7.78***
(2.90) (2.81)
Treatment Amount*Female -8.24** -8.60**
(4.06) (3.97)
Capital Stock  11.29** 11.07**
(4.67) (4.53)
Capital Stock *Female -11.39* -12.05**
(6.17) (6.03)
Treatment* 1-4 quarters post treatment 7.75*** -0.91
(2.79) (2.74)
Treatment* 5-8 quarters post treatment 7.84** -0.84
(3.78) (3.91)
Treatment* 9+ quarters post treatment 7.64* -3.24
(4.57) (4.51)
Observations 3697 3697 3518 3518 1870 1827
Number of firms 365 365 364 364 183 182
Testing the overall female effect is zero (p-values)
Amount+Amount*Female=0 0.945 0.769
Capital + Capital*Female=0 0.981 0.805
First-stage Coefficients:
First-stage for Capital
Amount   0.733 0.733
(p value) 0.00 0.00
First-stage for Capital*Female
Amount*Female 0.697 0.697
(p value) 0.00 0.00
Notes: 
Robust Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by enterprise 
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
Results shown trim firms with extreme increases in profits (top 1% in percentage and absolute changes)
Adjusted profits are real profits less the value of the owner's time, estimated in six education / gender
   cells using a simple production function run on the baseline data.  




FE FE FE FE FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Treatment Amount 100 1.38** 0.63* 13.58***
(0.649) (0.317) (3.70)
Amount 100 * Female -1.39** -0.41 -14.15***
(0.708) (0.402) (5.25)
Treatment Amount 200 1.22*** 1.43*** 12.95***
(0.430) (0.386) (4.06)
Amount 200 * Female 0.475 -0.46 -14.83**
(0.777) (0.758) (6.46)
Amount * % inventories 8.53** 1.39
(3.35) (4.39)
Amount* % equipment 5.3 -5.8
(6.53) (5.88)
Observations 3519 1135 3697 1772 1775
Number of Firms 365 365 365 173 176
Notes: 
Robust Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by enterprise 
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
The sample in Column 2 is limited to controls and the first wave after treatment
Adjusted profits are real profits less the value of the owner's time, estimated in six








  -  -  36Table 4: Do Women invest less in the business and more on children?
5 to 12 12 to 15 17 to 18 Groceries Health Education
FE FE FE FE FE FE FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Treatment Amount -0.0310 -0.0110 -0.0050 -5.00 -0.56 -0.11 0.282**
-(0.060) (0.062) (0.113) (5.63) (1.40) (0.75) -(0.110)
Amount*Female -0.0120 0.0218 0.1230 10.50 0.40 -0.27 -0.259*
(0.081) (0.081) (0.148) (8.64) (1.83) (0.98) -(0.148)
Baseline mean of dependent 0.923 0.915 0.533 6810 678 474 0
variable
Observations 605 433 272 1328 1328 1328 1393
Number of Firms 210 158 135 361 361 361 365
Notes: 
Robust Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by enterprise 
 *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
Data from household module conducted each April from 2005 through 2008.
Household asset index is the first principal component of 19 household 17 household assets.
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FE FE FE FE FE
(2) (3) (4) (5) (1)
Treatment Amount 8.01*** 8.41*** 0.44 7.60 7.77***
(3.11) (2.99) (1.26) (4.50) (2.83)
Amount*Female -8.14 -8.62** -2.09 -8.93 -8.53**
(4.47) (4.24) (4.96) (5.93) (3.97)
Spouse present at interview -4.33*
(2.33)




Observations 3486 3486 3799 1534 3697
Number of Firms 332 332 365 152 365
Notes:
Robust Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by enterprise 
 *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
Decision making power in the household is measured as the sum of 4 purchase decisions in which the owner 
is involved. Decision making power in the business indicates the owner makes input and equipment purchase 
decisions without input from his/her spouse. 
















Adjusted Profits Adjusted Profits
 
 
Table 6: How do the characteristics of male and female owners differ?
T-test
Males Females p value
Ever had a formal loan 0.23 0.23 0.99
Number of Wage Workers 0.55 0.87 0.00
Asset Index -0.20 0.20 0.04
Years of Education 8.57 9.41 0.01
Digitspan Recall 5.88 5.61 0.06
Entrepreneurial Self-efficacy 31.51 30.79 0.22
Polychronicity 7.76 7.32 0.06
In Self-employment to care for children 0.40 0.49 0.09
In Self-employment for business growth 0.31 0.35 0.55
Risk Aversion 0.37 -0.07 0.01
Mean value
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Dependent Variable: Real profits adjusted for own hours
FE  FE  FE FE FE FE FE FE
(5)  (6)  (7) (8) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Amount  7.88**   7.78*** 7.86*** 7.07** 7.38*** *
(2.77) 
7.41** 7.90*** 6.77**
(2.89)  (2.81) (2.87) (2.82) (2.83) (2.90) (2.95)
Amount*Female 
 





(3.97) (4.00) (4.17) (3.86) (3.99) (4.24)
Amount*Ever had a formal loan  -7.85 -8.82
(5.76) (5.66)
Amount*Number of Wage Workers  -3.16 -1.86
(2.46) (2.48)
Amount*Household Asset Index  -1.81 -2.82**
(1.16) (1.17)




Amount*Digitspan recall  2.62  1.42
(1.66)  (1.56)
Amount*Risk aversion  -0.61 -0.13
(1.14) (114.00)
Observations  3697  3655  3697 3697 3697 3697 3697 3655
Number of enterprises  365  356  365 365 365 365 365 356
Robust Standard errors in parentheses, *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
All variables used in the interaction apart from gender are standardized to have mean zero by subtracting off their mean. 







651.5 *** -750.6 ** 324
(241) (373)
Adding the interaction between amount and:
Time taken to solve a maze 8.13 *** -9.16 ** 0.07 363
(2.81) (4.06) (4.52)
Father owned a Business 7.60 *** -8.20 ** 3.64 365
(2.89) (3.95) 3.77
Mother owned a Business 7.64 *** -8.44 ** -1.40 365
(2.87) (3.97) (5.49)
Optimism 7.95 *** -8.64 ** 0.38 364
(2.76) (3.95) (1.37)
Went into self-employment to 8.05 *** -9.26 ** 0.82 353
   care for family members (2.87) (4.13) (1.30)
Went into Self-employment for  7.81 *** -8.76 ** 1.43 353
   business growth reasons (2.93) (4.07) (4.14)
Business operated out of the hom 7.84 *** -8.89 ** 2.80 365
(2.84) (4.04) (4.03)
Entrepreneurial Self-efficacy 8.06 *** -9.59 ** -0.54 354
(2.95) (4.24) (0.36)
Financial Literacy 7.30 *** -8.08 ** 0.25 365
(2.76) (4.02) (1.90)
Impulsiveness 7.20 ** -8.32 ** -0.31 339
(2.93) (4.21) (1.30)
Passion for Work 7.24 ** -7.45 * 2.22 339
(2.91) (4.26) (2.98)
Tenacity 7.55 *** -8.61 ** -0.98 339
(2.90) (4.10) (2.00)
Locus of Control 7.85 *** -8.72 ** -0.25 339
(2.96) (4.29) (0.97)
Trust 7.76 *** -8.20 ** 1.63 339
(2.96) (4.10) (2.38)
Achievement Motivation 7.61 ** -8.14 * -0.16 339
(2.96) (4.24) (0.89)
Power Motivation 7.80 ** -8.36 * 0.05 339
(3.04) (4.30) (1.10)
Polychronicity 7.43 ** -8.07 * 0.68 339
(2.95) (4.18) (0.89)
Work Centrality 7.38 ** -8.10 * -1.82 339
(2.96) (4.17) (2.34)
Organized Person 7.88 *** -8.33 ** -2.83 339
(2.94) (4.21) (3.66)
Notes: Results in Rows show the coefficients from adding the interaction between a particular proxy for
ability and the treatment amount to the baseline specification (column 1 of Table 7). Regressions also
include the interaction between this characteristics and wave effects.
Robust Standard errors shown in Parentheses, *, **, and *** interact significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels.
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Dependent Variable: Real profits adjusted for own hours worked
All Firms All Firms
Only industries with 
participation from 
both genders above 
25%
Only industries with 
participation below 
25% from one gender
Panel A: Treatment effect
Amount 6.91** 5.91* 8.28** 7.64*
(2.72) (3.58) (4.16) (3.91)
Amount*Female -7.51* -9.48** -7.83 -13.86*
(3.92) (3.77) (4.96) (7.11)
Obs. 3722 3697 1994 1703
Firms 365 365 196 169
Panel B: Returns to Capital
Capital Stock 10.06** 9.63 13.67* 9.54
(4.33) (6.12) (7.54) (5.81)
Capital Stock*Female -10.71* -13.34** -12.8 -18.01*
(5.87) (6.62) (8.59) (8.71)
Obs. 3541 3518 1944 1574
Firms 364 364 196 168
Industry*Wave effects no yes no no
Industry*Amount controls no yes no no
Robust Standard errors in parentheses, *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
Column 2 include 8 industry dummies and 80 industry*wave dummies. The samples in Columns (3) 
and (4) are restricted using the distribution of male and female ownership in 20 industries with more 
than 4 enterprises in the sample.   
  -  -  41 Table 10: Do the results generalize to other countries?
Dependent Variable: Monthly Microenterprise Profits (US dollars)
All Industries Industries All Industries Industries
industries which are in which industries which are in which
predominantly both genders predominantly both genders
one gender participate one gender participate
( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )( 6 )
Capital Stock (excluding land and buildings) 0.166*** 0.180*** 0.178*** 0.400*** 0.411*** 0.153***
(0.0131) (0.0164) (0.0227) (0.0173) (0.0376) (0.0433)
Capital Stock*Female -0.0764*** -0.123*** -0.0816*** -0.132*** -0.190** 0.0174
(0.0231) (0.0465) (0.0314) (0.0309) (0.0964) (0.0649)
Female -66.49*** -63.75*** -39.17*** -63.64*** -66.15*** -52.03***
(4.499) (9.988) (6.072) (4.606) (18.56) (13.51)
Observations 9773 6017 3305 15875 4581 3952
R-squared 0.186 0.170 0.161 0.221 0.145 0.259
Notes:
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All regressions also include controls for age and education of the owner and own hours worked.
Mexico regressions also include year of survey dummies.
Industry subsamples in (2) and (5) are industries which are either less than 25% female, or more than 75% female
Industry subsamples in (3) and (6) are industries which are between 26% and 74% female.
Industry subsamples restricted to industries with at least 50 firms in the sample.
MEXICO BRAZIL
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Dependent Variable: Real profits adjusted for own hours worked
FE FE FE FE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Amount -0.82 -0.81 1.00 0.81
(2.80) (2.87) (2.58) (2.44)
Amount*Ever had formal loan -1.18
(6.63)
Amount*Number of Wage Workers 1.39
(3.26)
Amount*Household Asset Index -2.95*
(1.51)
Amount*Years of Education 0.55 0.08
(0.81) 0.91




Observations 1827 1827 1805 1805
Number of enterprises 182 182 177 177
% with mean treatment less than or equal to 0 47.9 48.3 59.0
% with mean treatment between 0 and 200 51.6 10.1 5.0
% with mean treatment between 200 and 500 0.5 19.6 9.0
% with mean treatment of more than 500 0.0 22.0 27.0
Notes:
Robust Standard errors in parentheses, *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
All variables used in the interaction apart from gender are standardized to have mean zero by subtracting off their mean.
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